We consider a cloud based multiserver system consisting of a set of replica application servers behind a set of proxy (indirection) servers which interact directly with clients over the Internet. We study a proactive moving-target defense to thwart an attacker's reconnaissance phase and consequently decreases the success rate of the planned attack. The moving-target defense is a dynamic identity-changing technique for the indirection servers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two very significant, high-volume botnet based DDoS attacks were witnessed in Fall 2016 [6] , [8] . The Dyn attack was launched by IoT-device bots (compromised using factory default credentials) against Oracle DNS service. Since 2016, other significant attacks have involved, e.g., the Mirai, Hajime and Briker Bot botnets, which largely consist of compromised IoT devices (typically via known exploits). Indeed, many (not just legacy) IoT devices cannot be secured. Thus, infrastructure based defenses need to be mobilized against such DDoS attacks. Such defenses can be situated at the attacker-side network edge (e.g., egress filtering), within the network (e.g., Akamai Prolexic), or on the premises of the targeted victim (enterprise based defenses, e.g., reactive dispersive autoscaling, challenge-response, and anomaly detection). In this paper, we consider the last context. Specifically, consider DDoS attacks targeting individual multiserver tenants of a public cloud (the tenant may have presence in multiple datacenters/availability-regions of the cloud). In each datacenter, the tenants replica application servers are accessed through a bank of proxy servers. DNS lookup by clients/customers of the tenant typically resolve to the closest Load-Balancing Router (LBR) of a cloud domain (datacenter, availability region) in which the tenant resides. A client is assigned to a (TCP) proxy by the LBR via a NAT [7] . Via NAT's use of layer-4 port numbers, a large pool of identities (combined IPv4 addresses and port numbers) are available for proxies, most of which are blackholed/unassigned by the LBR at any given time 1 . Specifically how clients are assigned to cloud domains, proxies and application servers can be controlled by a coordination server, see Figure 1 . The proxies and replicas could be implemented in Virtual Machines (VMs) or lightweight containers on physical servers. The clients never know the IP addresses of the replicas, only those of the proxies. That is, the proxies segment the (TCP) sessions between clients and application replicas. Load-balanced content distribution networks (CDNs) or session establishment/initiation systems are examples adaptable to this architecture.
Though a volumetric (flooding) DDoS attack would overwhelm the proxies before the LBR, i.e., the LBR would not be the bottleneck, the proxies shield the replica application servers from direct flooding attacks 2 . Note that each application replica server can be reached by different proxies.
In the following, we propose a "moving target" defense wherein the proxy servers (via LBR NAT) periodically change their identities (the virtual servers change). But if most bots can perform DNS lookup to determine the LBR, then they can simply launch, e.g., a SYN flood; so changing proxy identities will be ineffective because the 1 In an IPv6 context, a NAT would obviously not be needed. 2 But proxies do not protect against (non-volumetric) application-layer DDoS attacks such as Slowloris [12] and BlackNurse [5] , see e.g., [11] , [10] . Fig. 1 : Overview of system architecture LBR will always assign a new SYN packet to a current proxy identity. A tenant's active LBR in a cloud domain can also change 3 to try to address this issue. Flooding bots would not be able to detect changes in the LBR, and so would need to perform a lot of DNS lookups just in case the LBR's identity has changed. Though SYN floods may be performed with spoofed source-IP addresses, DNS queries cannot, and so a lot of DNS lookups proximal in time for the same domain name by the same source IP result -a simple signature easily detected. Note that nominal, active clients can accommodate redirection to the new servers. For "algorithmic" (non volumetric) attacks that require maintaining a session with a replica application server (e.g., [12] , [5] ), simple (IoT-based) bots need to periodically terminate and restart new sessions, assuming they cannot handle redirection when proxy identities change.
In this paper, we consider a DDoS attack that has the following phases (after formation of the botnet itself): 1) Reconnaissance (conducted by a subset of bots on more powerful hosts):
• Vulnerabilities -Identify bottleneck resources/web-pages through probing and assessing responsiveness.
• Identities -The attacker needs to determine the (current) identities of as many proxies as possible of the targeted tenant (our focus herein). 2) Targeting: harvest the proxy identities and, using them, "aim" the bots to launch the DDoS attack. Targeting could be immediately after or hours after reconnaissance. 3) DDoS attack itself: volumetric flood impacting proxies or low-volume application-level attack targeting application replica servers. Also, once the attack is launched, the attacker may engage in • attack assessment (including by third parties), e.g., by probing the victim's responsiveness, and subsequently either adjusting the current attack or cycling through different attack toolkits, and/or • continued vulnerability/identity reconnaissance, e.g., to determine whether packets being filtered by Akamai's Prolexic. We focus herein on combating the reconnaissance phase of the attack. In DDoS attacks, a potentially large portion of the attacker's time is spent on reconnaissance, e.g., 45% of attacker's time was reported in [7] . There is a large array of techniques for conducting reconnaissance. [1] lists 19 techniques and studies the advantages and disadvantages of each. Passive reconnaissance could simply leverage information from, e.g., shodan.io and scans.io. Active reconnaissance can be performed using (legitimate) port scanning, e.g., Nmap, ZMap, especially for more surgical (non-volumetric) application-layer attacks. Most active techniques described in [1] use half-open TCP connections, so may be detected by intrusion detection systems. More sophisticated reconnaissance involves, e.g., login attempts using stolen credentials, OCR to defeat CAPTCHA challenge-response during login, and mock sessions once established. Depending on the reconnoitering bot's host, some of these more sophisticated techniques may or may not be possible. Reconnaissance could involve TOR for anonymity and increased apparent source diversity, but TOR is often used for vulnerability scanning and its exit routers are typically blacklisted. A botnet could also use more costly VPNs for anonymity, but they don't give increased source diversity from the attacktarget's point of view. Finally, increase source diversity could be achieved behind dynamic DNS service.
The proxies may detect active reconnaissance by standard means, e.g., by counting over a sliding time-window the number of half-opened TCP sessions, failed login attempts, and/or successful log-ins/sessions by a single client, i.e., a client reputation system. A client reputation system can also be informed by detected mock sessions (after successful log in) possibly via application-layer IDS/firewall. However, a client reputation system would be undermined by the attacker's use of TOR, VPNs or dynamic DNS.
In this paper, we study a proactive moving-target defense against reconnaissance wherein proxies periodically change their identities. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe this defense and discuss its impact, particularly considering the types of bots used for reconnaissance. In Section III, we describe a simulation and mathematical models capturing the performance of this moving-target defense. The paper concludes with acknowledgements.
II. PROACTIVE MOVING-TARGET DEFENSE AGAINST RECONNAISSANCE BY CHANGING PROXY IDENTITIES
Again, a large pool of NATed identities 4 , most of which are unassigned/blackholed, are shared among a group of tenants. The proactive moving-target defense involves a tenant's proxies periodically swapping their identities with those that are currently blackholed. Practically, this may involve spinning-up new proxies with new identities and redirecting clients to them -a cost of this defense for nominal clients.
Note that this moving-target defense forces active reconnaissance and longer mock sessions to follow redirected proxies (e.g., HTTP or RTSP redirect) and an expedited targeting phase. Also note that active reconnaissance requires TCP -it cannot be performed with spoofed source (client) IPs.
In [2] , [3] , the authors study a similar moving-target defense through a simple "urn based" model and analyze its efficiency as a function of size of the network, number of devices to be protected, and the frequency at which proxies identities change. They also study the cost of changing proxy identities for legitimate users through simulation and traffic traces. In the following, we study this defense using Markov models for different reconnaissance scenarios.
Obviously, one can instead selectively change identities of individual proxies, not all of them at once, e.g., selecting those experiencing a sufficiently high number of half-opened TCP sessions and so are likely being actively reconnoitered.
Also, Round-Robin (RR) DNS records could be used to resolve among plural LBRs of a (single) datacenter. Load balancing techniques could be based on (proxy or application) server loads. Depending on the application, techniques such as consistent hashing could be used to assign clients to servers.
A. Hot proxy redirection
Persistent HTTP connections, which are part of the HTTP/1.1 standard [4] , require an active TCP connection between the client and the server to avoid connection setup overhead. This TCP connection is subject to termination by the server after some idle time. Redirecting persistent HTTP connections via the HTTP REDIRECT command, requires tearing down the current TCP connection and establishing a new TCP connection between the client and the new server, which can result in some service interruptions.
As another example, redirecting a streamed-media session using the RTSP protocol [9] requires an RTSP TEARDOWN and RTSP SETUP (at minimum) to establish the new RTSP session with the new server. Additionally, the control and streaming connections over UDP (RTCP and RTP connections respectively) need to be setup with the new server.
B. Implications of the types of bot-hosts used for reconnaissance
More numerous, simple IoT devices used for reconnaissance may not be able to execute a login script with challenge-response, fabricate realistic mock sessions and deal with redirection -events/activities that proxies can monitor. More powerful bots may be able to mount realistic mock sessions and deal with redirection, but may be fewer in number. Again, if source IPs correspond to a few reconnoitering/probing bots (collectors), then those few bots may be associated with an anomalously high number of simultaneous sessions. Again, this may be mitigated from the attack-target's point of view if the bots are behind a dynamic DNS service. If bots can handle redirect, then moving-target defense may change identities in the time required to target/aim the botnet (again, the attacker needs to expedite targeting). If bots cannot handle redirect, every change of the proxy identities renders stale the proxy identities known to the botnet.
III. MODELING OF PROACTIVE MOVING-TARGET DEFENSE TO DEFEAT BOTNET RECONNAISSANCE
In this section we model and analyze different types of reconnaissance and effective moving-target defenses by considering the following: (i) different probing strategies, e.g., deterministic versus random inter-probing time, (ii) different ratios of rates of bot-probes to proxy identity changes, and (iii) different client-to-proxy assignments by the LBR, e.g., random and round-robin assignment. We model different reconnaissance techniques as Markov models and show their accuracy through numerical experiments for different cases.
A. Two Markov models
Let U (t) be the number of proxy-server identities unknown to the botnet at time t. Assume there are M proxies in total. We assume the bot probing processes are independent Poisson, each with mean rate 1/(M T pr ) = β/M and the time between changes in proxy identities are independent and exponentially distributed (with mean T sh = 1/δ). We use random times between proxy identity changes since a deterministic time may be learned (and anticipated) by the attacker. Consequently, we model U as a continuous-time Markov chain with transition rates to/from states m as
The average probing rate β = 1/T pr captures how quickly the botnet can identify a proxy (possibly including e.g., DNS transaction delays), which may become more difficult with fewer proxies unknown to the botnet (smaller U ). The invariant distribution π of (not time-reversible) U satisfies the full balance equations π Q = 0 , where the transition rate matrix Q = [q i,j ] and q i,i = − j =i q i,j . Let 
Note that EU ↓ 0 as z → ∞ and that EU ↑ M as z ↓ 0, see Figure 4 .
2) q m,m−1 = βm/M for all m ∈ {1, 2, ..., M } (Figure 3 ): In this case, decreasing transition rates as the number of unknown proxies decreases as oppose to fixed transition rates β. We solve the full balance equations for this Markov model and get the following invariant distribution for π
The steady-state mean number of unknown proxies to the bots (EU ) for this model and the Markov model with q m,m−1 = β is shown in Figure 4 for different values of z ∈ [1, 1000].
As expected, the number of unknown proxies is higher when q m,m−1 = βm/M . For the Markov model with transition rates q m,m−1 = βm/M , the number of unknown proxies EU ≥ 50 for z ≤ 100 which means the rate at which proxy identities change should be at most 0.01 times the probing rate, i.e., 1/δ = T sh ≤ 100T pr = 1/β.
B. Why the Markov model of Figure 3?
Consider the following assumptions: A1) i.i.d. exponential inter-probing times (∼ exp(β)) A2) i.i.d. exponential times between successive proxy identity changes (∼ exp(δ)) A3) i.i.d. uniformly random assignment of clients to proxies (and these are independent of each other).
U is Markovian under these assumptions because in state U = m (m unknown proxies), a geometrically distributed number of probes K is required to find an unknown proxy,
So the the total probing time F m ∼ Γ(K, β) (a.k.a. Erlang(K, β)), i.e., the sum of K independent exp(β) random variables, each of mean T pr = 1/β. It's easy to show using moment generating functions and conditioning on K that F m ∼ exp(βm/M ), cf., next section's discussion of Figure 5 . Again, note that assumption A2 might be in the best interests of the defender so that the botnet cannot predict when the proxy identity changes will occur.
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS In this section, we evaluate the selected Markov models in Section III numerically. Note that in order to investigate and model the number of unknown proxies we have to deal with the union of the knowledge-base of all the bots. The information about the same proxy at different bots is considered redundant to the attacker. However as shown in Section III-B the state space is shown to be Markovian, hence we see almost the same behavior for the model and simulation as expected.
A. Simulation Setup
We consider N = 1000 probing bots and M = 100 proxies which are under reconnaissance at rate β = 1 (T pr = 1s) and average time between proxy identity changes T sh = δ −1 ∈ {1, 5, 10, . . . , 1000}s for simulation duration of 7 days (T = 7 days). Initially, all proxies are unknown to the botnet, U = 100.
The simulation generates two types of events: (i) probing events, and (ii) proxy-identity-change events. Note that (i) gives either a successful probe or redundant probe, which results in a state change or the same state respectively, see Figure 5 . The probing event for one of the N bots is modeled as a Poisson process with rate 1/(N T pr ) resulting in aggregate probing rate 1/T pr . In each of these probing events, the identity of one of the proxies is assigned uniformly at random to one of the probing bots. In order to simulate the proxy identity changes, we consider an independent Poisson process with rate 1/T sh . At each proxy-identity change event, the information of all the bots is considered stale and hence we reset U = 100.
EU (Empirical EU ) is calculated as follows:
The proxy assignment to the bots is done by LBR and could be done considering different scheduling policies. We consider the following two cases (i) random assignment, and (ii) Round-Robin (RR) assignment in our experiments.
B. Random client-to-proxy assignments
In this scenario, we assume random assignment of proxies to the incoming clients. Hence at each probing event, one of the proxies is chosen uniformly at random with probability 1/M and is assigned to the probing bot. This scenario is perfectly modeled as Markov chain with transition rates βm/M of Section III and Figure 3 .
We show the experimental result versus the Markov model with transitions rates βm/M in Figure 6 . As expected, we see that there is almost a perfect match between the empirical average and the model. As another check, we also calculate the empirical transition rates by fitting an exponential distribution to the inter-arrival time between the state transitions for our simulation. The empirical rate of transitions during the simulation can be observed in Figure 7 . For fixed T pr and number of simulation trials, the measured transition rate converges to the modeled transition rates βm/M as T sh increases simply by the law of large numbers. 
C. Round-robin client-to-proxy assignments
Regarding assumption A3 from Section III-B, we also considered round-robin assignment of clients to proxies. To this end, we also need to consider the session establishment activity of nominal clients, say at rate α.
We expect that if α β, then EU based on the Markov chain with constant β transitions ( Figure 2 ) is a better approximation. But if α β, then under assumptions A1-A3, EU will be well approximated by Markov chain with βm/M transitions (Figure 3) . In Figure 9 , we show the Markov models and empirical EU values achieved for a range of α ∈ {0.001, 1, 100} and β = 1. As we expected smaller α result in closer behavior to Markov model with constant transitions β, and larger α is closer to the Markov model with transition rates βm/M .
D. Deterministic probing
Regarding assumption A1 in Section III-B, we also simulated a system with deterministic inter-probing times. We see that the above Markov model under assumptions A1-A3 (Figure 3 ) leads to a good approximation of the mean number of unknown proxies when bots are probing with deterministic inter-probing time, see Figure 10 . Note Comparison between Markov models with transitions β and βm/M vs. experiment results under round-robin assignment of proxies to clients. Experiments are conducted for T = 7 days, M = 100 and T sh ∈ {1, 5, 10, . . . , 1000}s. Markov models with β and βm/M almost overlap with simulation results α = 0.01β and α = 100β, respectively. that deterministic probing by a bot may be detectable by an IDS covering it. To defeat the IDS, the bot may use random inter-probing times.
With constant probing T pr = 1/β and constant times between proxy identity changes, T sh = 1/δ > T pr , the number of clients known to the botnet simply achieves a maximum of min{M, β/δ}. 5 , the Poisson process of proxy-identity changes (at rate δ) sees the M/M/∞ queue in steady-state, and so α/µ clients are on-average affected by each proxy-identity change. Also, a given client is expected to experience δ/µ proxy-identity changes. Indeed, by the memoryless property of (independent) exponentials, the number of proxy-identity changes σ experienced by a client is geometrically distributed, P(σ = k) = (δ/µ) k (1 − δ/µ) for integers k ≥ 0.
A. Accounting for targeting time
Even if reconnaissance discovers all the proxies, their identities may be changed in the time T aim it takes to target the bots once reconnaissance concludes. The probability that the proxy identities are changed during the targeting phase is simply 1 − exp(−T aim /T sh ).
Again, this random, independent and exponentially distributed (memoryless) random time between proxy-identity changes (with mean T sh = 1/δ) are motivated by desire that attacker not learn and be able to anticipate next proxy identity change.
